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How calibration committees can mitigate performance evaluation bias: 
An analysis of implicit incentives 
 
 
ABSTRACT: While prior research on performance evaluation bias has mainly focused on the 
determinants and consequences of rating errors, we investigate how a firm can provide implicit 
incentives to supervisors to mitigate these errors via its calibration committee. We empirically 
examine the extent to which a calibration committee incorporates supervisors’ evaluation behavior 
with respect to their subordinates in the performance evaluation outcomes, i.e., performance ratings 
and promotion decisions, for these supervisors. In our study, we distinguish between lack of skills 
and opportunism as two important facets of evaluation behavior, which we expect the calibration 
committee to address differently. Using panel data of a professional service firm, we show that 
supervisors’ opportunistic behavior to strategically inflate subordinates’ performance ratings is 
disciplined through a decrease in the supervisors’ own performance rating, while the supervisors’ 
skills to provide less compressed and thus more informative performance ratings is rewarded 
through a higher likelihood of promotion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An increasingly used management control innovation aimed at mitigating performance evaluation 
bias is to allocate decision rights over performance ratings to so-called calibration committees (e.g., 
Demeré, Sedatole, and Woods 2019). These committees, typically comprised of higher-level 
managers, review and potentially adjust a subordinate’s initial performance rating provided by the 
direct supervisor. Demeré et al. (2019) provide the first evidence on the role of calibration 
committees in subjective performance evaluation systems and examine the nature of calibration 
committee adjustments to supervisors’ reported ratings of their subordinates. We extend this stream 
of research by investigating whether the calibration committee attaches consequences to the way 
supervisors evaluate and rate their subordinates. In particular, we examine whether a firm’s 
calibration committee provides implicit incentives to supervisors to mitigate rating errors by 
incorporating supervisors’ evaluation behavior with respect to their subordinates in their own 
performance evaluation outcomes, i.e., performance ratings and promotion decisions. 
A relatively recent survey finds that more than 50% of firms set up calibration committees to 
validate the performance and potential of each employee against the relevant peer group (Hastings 
2012). Accordingly, the primary stated purposes of calibration committees are to mitigate inter-
rater differences, increase the information content of performance ratings, ensure consistency in 
the application of performance standards, attenuate the biases that supervisors introduce, but also 
to help identify supervisors who induce such rating errors (Demeré et al. 2019). During the 
calibration sessions, higher-level managers discuss the subordinates’ performance based on 
information from a variety of stakeholders including the supervisors, who all can provide different 
insights about the subordinates. If considered necessary, the calibration committee adjusts the 
initial ratings that have been recommended by the supervisors. In this way, the calibration 
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committee tries to correct error-prone ratings provided by the supervisors, but at the same time 
tries to identify, to the best of its ability, the supervisors that cause biased performance ratings.  
Now the calibration committee basically has two options to use this information: either it only 
adjusts the initial ratings without any further consequences for the supervisors, or it attaches 
consequences to these adjustments and thereby provides implicit incentives to supervisors to 
prepare more accurate, and thus more useful performance ratings of their subordinates. Given the 
costly consequences of performance evaluation bias for the firm in terms of incorrect personnel 
decisions and inadequate resource allocation, we expect that, over and above adjusting the initial 
ratings, the calibration committee will make use of this information for incentivizing supervisors 
to become better at their task, thereby decreasing the cost of performance evaluation bias.  
In our study, we focus on the lack of supervisory skills and opportunism as two important 
facets of evaluation behavior that the calibration committee aims to address. We develop theory 
that links each of these facets to specific biases. More specifically, the lack of relevant supervisory 
skills is expected to be reflected in more compressed performance ratings, while opportunism is 
expected to be reflected in systematically higher-than-warranted ratings. Firms therefore face the 
dilemma that, while the input of supervisors is crucial when evaluating subordinates, the 
performance ratings might be biased by the supervisors. We expect that, in addition to correcting 
any bias by adjusting the ratings recommended by the supervisors, the calibration committee tries 
to mitigate opportunistic bias by providing disincentives for opportunistic behavior, while it aims 
to mitigate skill-driven bias by providing incentives for the investment in supervisory skills. We 
argue that the calibration committee uses the annual performance ratings and promotions to address 
opportunistic and skill-driven bias, and we describe the relative importance of these two 
mechanisms in solving these different types of incentive issues in our hypotheses development.  
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To analyze the decisions of the calibration committee, we conduct a field study at an 
international professional service provider. The typical calibration committee in professional 
service firms consists of higher-level managers as well as the direct supervisors and their peers, 
and has decision rights over final performance ratings and associated monetary compensation, but 
is also entrusted with promotion and termination decisions. Using proprietary archival data of 952 
individual supervisors for the time period of 2010-2012, we investigate the incremental effect of 
different measures of supervisors’ evaluation behavior on their own performance ratings and 
promotion opportunities, over and above other signals of their past and current performance. Our 
results indicate that, when the calibration committee observes signals of opportunistic rating 
behavior, the supervisor is disciplined with a decrease in her performance rating, which has both 
compensation and career consequences. We further find that signals relating to the supervisor’s 
skill to discriminate among subordinate performance levels are positively associated with the 
likelihood of being promoted, which is consistent with the argument that promotion mechanisms 
are effective for inducing skill acquisition (Grabner and Moers 2019; Kahn and Huberman 1988; 
Prendergast 1993). Taken together, the firm encourages supervisors via its calibration committee 
to invest in their long-term skills and to refrain from activities that provide short-term rewards at 
the cost of the firm. Follow-up interviews with partners at our research site as well as other 
members of the professional service provider’s network confirm our inferences. 
Our study makes several contributions to the incentive and performance evaluation literature. 
While the use of calibration committees has become an important trend in business practice (Risher 
2011, 2014), academic research on the role of calibration committees in decreasing the cost of 
subjectivity is still scarce. The few studies addressing calibration committees focus on the impact 
of the presence of calibration committees on supervisor evaluation behavior (Arshad, Cardinaels, 
and Dierynck 2017), the process through which calibration committees aim to mitigate bias (Lillis, 
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Malina, and Mundy 2017), and the nature as well as determinants of rating adjustments through 
the calibration committee (Bol, Aguiar, and Lill 2019; Demeré et al. 2019). While these concurrent 
studies focus on the calibration process, we provide insights into the consequences thereof. We 
contribute to this emerging stream of research by investigating the consequences the calibration 
committee attaches to the way supervisors evaluate and rate their subordinates, in an attempt to 
incentivize more accurate, and thus less biased rating behavior.  
Relatedly, very little attention has been paid to the mechanisms that firms use to reduce rating 
errors (recent exceptions are Bol, Kramer, and Maas 2016, Demeré et al. 2019, and Lillis et al. 
2017). Our results indicate that a firm’s calibration committee can provide implicit incentives to 
supervisors to mitigate rating errors by incorporating supervisors’ evaluation behavior with respect 
to their subordinates in their own performance evaluation outcomes. In particular, supervisors are 
rewarded when they sufficiently differentiate among subordinate performance levels and signal 
their supervisory skills, while they are disciplined when expected to have engaged in opportunistic 
rating behavior, which includes providing inflated performance ratings. Despite the suggested 
motivational effects of inflated ratings (Bol 2011), our results indicate that the calibration 
committee perceives higher ratings than warranted as a distortion of the employee performance 
assessment, and incentivizes supervisors to reduce such errors. Further, our study contributes to 
the growing literature on how to incentivize the acquisition of human capital in general (Grabner 
and Moers 2019), and in particular how to encourage supervisors to effectively pass on their 
knowledge and experience to their subordinates and guide them in their professional and personal 
development. Given the increasing importance of human capital for firm performance in today’s 
growing knowledge society, the results of our study give an indication of how firms can incentivize 
supervisors to effectively use, or further develop, their supervisory skills.  
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II. THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Costs of performance evaluation bias 
The evaluation of subordinates’ performance relies to a large extent on a supervisor’s subjective 
assessment. The major advantage of relying on such subjective judgment is that supervisors are 
expected to have superior information about their subordinates that is not captured by objective 
performance indicators (Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus 2004; Prendergast 1999). 
However, as soon as subjectivity enters the evaluation process, the complexity of the appraisal 
process as well as personal limitations provide sufficient opportunity for errors in performance 
evaluations, both intentional and unintentional ones. That is, independent of the cause of those 
rating errors (biases), supervisors potentially provide inaccurate information and hence distorted 
signals about subordinate performance, despite their possession of superior information.  
This distortion inhibits the firm’s decision-making in several ways. First, management and 
the human resource department receive inaccurate signals about the true performance of the 
workforce, and hence cannot efficiently (re-)allocate workers to particular jobs and tasks. 
Furthermore, while such rating errors in general imply both too high as well as too low ratings, 
supervisors lean towards upward-biasing their subjective ratings (Bol 2008, 2011; Moers 2005). 
Since those ratings are often tied to some type of compensation, the upward-biased ratings result 
in unjustified increased personnel costs, and potential budgeting distortions for future periods. On 
top, the respective subordinates receive a misrepresentation of their performance. Therefore, 
overstating a subordinate’s performance actually disguises the necessity for further development, 
and harms the subordinate’s potential for performance improvement. Even more problematic, if 
supervisors who tend towards such rating errors are promoted to higher ranks in the organization, 
these already substantial costs are amplified because after promotion they typically supervise a 
larger number of subordinates who also have more wide-ranging decision rights.  
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The role of the calibration committee in discovering and mitigating bias 
To minimize the occurrence of errors and bias, and thus mitigate the costs thereof, firms often 
install calibration committees (hereafter CC) to review and potentially adjust the initial 
performance ratings provided by the supervisors (Demeré et al. 2019). During the calibration 
sessions, higher-level management deliberates with each supervisor on the performance of the 
supervisor’s subordinates and their initial performance ratings. At the same time, such a session 
provides the CC with the opportunity to scrutinize the supervisor’s performance evaluation and 
rating behavior, and to assess her potential contribution to the aforementioned costs of rating errors. 
First of all, these sessions require the supervisor to thoroughly prepare in terms of gathering and 
integrating various information related to the performance of each subordinate, and a clear 
justification for the initial performance rating for each subordinate (Arshad et al. 2017). Yet, the 
proper preparation of information and her argumentation proficiency is only a subset of the 
information that the CC can use to evaluate the supervisor. Due to the close personal interaction 
during the calibration sessions and the use of questioning techniques, verbal and nonverbal cues 
are helpful in detecting whether an individual supervisor engages in impression management 
tactics, such as presenting themselves or their subordinates in an exaggerated positive way (Roulin, 
Bangerter, and Levashina 2015). Furthermore, sessions with multiple supervisors allow a 
comparison of how different supervisors act and bring forward arguments about their subordinates’ 
performance, and thus increase the chance that the CC can infer information about each 
supervisor’s rating and evaluation behavior. That is, while detecting biases remains an inherently 
difficult task and hence detection is far from guaranteed, the direct interaction with the supervisors 
enables the CC to at least partly monitor the supervisors’ rating and evaluation behavior.  
Therefore, whenever the CC is convinced to observe signals of inaccurate rating behavior, it 
adjusts the ratings that have been recommended by the supervisors. The adjustments to the initial 
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performance rating provided by the supervisors signal to the supervisors that the CC considers their 
ratings as inaccurate. Thus, the adjustments provide immediate feedback to the supervisors that 
their evaluation behavior needs to be improved.  
Given the considerable costs of inadequate performance evaluations, simply adjusting the 
initial ratings without any further actions by the CC may, however, not be sufficient for mitigating 
bias and hence increasing the quality of the supervisors’ evaluation behavior. Instead, we argue 
that the CC will incorporate its assessment of supervisors’ evaluation behavior when later 
evaluating the supervisors’ own performance and promotion. Given the CC’s insights from the 
previously described sessions with the supervisors, it has information at hand that can be used to 
attach consequences, both in a negative as well as a positive sense, to the supervisors’ evaluation 
behavior, and thereby provide implicit incentives to supervisors to prepare accurate performance 
ratings of their subordinates.  
We distinguish two important facets of evaluation behavior that the CC wants to attach 
consequences to: opportunistic behavior and supervisory skills. Regarding the former, the primary 
purpose of supervision is to guide and support subordinates in their work-related decisions and 
career. As such, subordinate performance reflects to some extent the actual supervision efforts 
provided for which the supervisor is responsible, and thus held accountable for in her own 
performance evaluation.1 This implies that higher performing subordinates will likely positively 
reflect on the supervisor’s own performance. Consequently, if her payoff is linked to the 
measurement of subordinate performance, it creates a purely economic motivation to manipulate 
this performance indicator (Ilgen, Mitchell, and Fredrickson 1981; Merchant and Van der Stede 
                                                          
1 A field study conducted by Dineen, Lewicki, and Tomlinson (2006) indicates that by providing guidance to 
subordinates, supervisors are able to induce greater levels of organizational citizenship and less deviant behavior, 
which in turn enhances performance (Podsakoff, Ahearne, and MacKenzie 1997). Along these lines, Bol, Estep, Moers, 
and Peecher (2018) find that supervisors high on tacit knowledge are better in developing subordinate competencies. 
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2017).2 Even without an explicit financial reward, the supervisor’s behavior is predominantly 
shaped by the expectations created by her superiors (Pfeffer and Salancik 1975), thus increasing 
the likelihood of impression management if expectations cannot be met.3 Hence, when a supervisor 
is asked to subjectively assess subordinate performance, the supervisor might opportunistically 
upward-bias (some of) her subordinates’ performance ratings to feign her productive efforts as 
supervisor. In other words, with the prospect in mind that the CC will not uncover this opportunistic 
behavior, supervisors have incentives to take actions that distort performance evaluations in their 
favor, thereby creating the aforementioned costs of rating errors for the firm.4  
Besides this opportunistic motive to induce bias, supervisors might also lack the necessary 
skills to conduct a proper performance review and provide accurate ratings to their subordinates. 
Prior research argues that supervisors experience substantial discomfort when evaluating others 
and often have difficulties in confronting subordinates with negative performance feedback and 
ratings (e.g., Bol 2011; Moers 2005; Villanova and Bernardin 1989). That is, even when the 
supervisor has gathered superior information about the subordinate, she may refrain from sharing 
this information with the subordinate if it contains negative feedback and a low performance rating, 
as it leads to a potential dispute with the subordinate. The supervisor is motivated to avoid such a 
confrontation so as to avoid the associated high personal costs.5 It logically follows that only for a 
                                                          
2 Consistent with this expectation, Rosaz and Villeval (2012) provide evidence that supervisors selfishly misreport 
subordinate performance to present themselves in a better light if they expect a certain payoff attached to this 
presentation. 
3 Impression management tactics are known to be present at various levels in firms, ranging from the subordinate 
ingratiating the supervisor to receive better performance evaluations, selecting highly paid peers to increase CEO 
compensation, to strategically choosing favorable information for earnings benchmarks (Faulkender and Yang 2010; 
Gordon 1996; Schrand and Walther 2000). 
4 We label supervisors’ behavior that is purely geared towards the increase of their performance rating to positively 
affect their financial payoff as opportunistic. That is, they decide to engage in impression management tactics to 
increase the chances of benefitting financially in the short-term instead of achieving long-term goals and rewards by 
actually increasing subordinate performance in a steady manner through adequate supervision. 
5 The costs of providing negative feedback relate to the unpleasant nature of giving such feedback, as well as the 
damage that such feedback can cause to the supervisor-subordinate relationship and subordinate motivation (Larson 
1984, 1989). 
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subordinate who is below some performance threshold, the supervisor will provide a higher rating 
than warranted, i.e., lenient ratings, to avoid such psychological costs. This implies that the lower 
part of the rating scale is inflated, which decreases the variance in subordinates’ initial performance 
ratings and hence causes compression. In essence, supervisors who lack the skills to provide 
accurate performance feedback and ratings are more likely to exhibit performance evaluation bias 
in terms of compressed ratings. 
However, some supervisors are more able than others to overcome the disutility associated 
with the consequences of providing such feedback (Harris 1994; Murphy and Cleveland 1991; 
Westermann et al. 2015). Such supervisors have not only internalized the firm’s objective to obtain 
accurate ratings, but also recognize the importance to foster the development of their subordinates 
in line with their responsibility as supervisor. As such, supervisors who are able and willing to 
discriminate among their subordinate performance levels and make use of the entire rating scale 
signal high supervisory skills. In line with that argumentation, Künneke (2017) provides empirical 
evidence that supervisors who exhibit a larger variance in their initial subordinate ratings contribute 
to a larger extent to their subordinates’ performance improvement than their non-discriminating 
counterparts. 
Despite both opportunism and lack of supervisory skills causing performance evaluation bias, 
they are two fundamentally different problems. That is, while the former is rather effort-related 
(both in the sense of not sufficiently providing the necessary effort to provide proper supervision 
as well as the ill-motivated effort to engage in impression management), the latter is more skill-
related. These differences are important for the CC to take into account when designing 
mechanisms to mitigate bias. Given that annual performance ratings and promotions are the most 
common incentive mechanisms in firms, we investigate the relative importance of these two 
mechanisms in addressing opportunism and insufficient skill development.  
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How the calibration committee mitigates bias 
Mitigating opportunistic rating behavior (H1a and H1b). Given that it is close to impossible for 
the CC to take away the economic incentives that trigger opportunism, it has to rely on dis-
incentivizing supervisors’ opportunistic behavior to mitigate biased subordinate information. 
Therefore, we argue that the CC attaches direct consequences for the supervisors to this 
opportunistic behavior.6 In particular, we expect that the CC decreases the supervisor’s own annual 
performance rating to send a clear and especially timely signal to the supervisor to direct her efforts 
in the next performance period towards the supervision and development of her subordinates 
instead of manipulating subordinate performance indicators. Since firms predominantly link annual 
compensation to performance ratings (e.g., Merchant and Van der Stede 2017), a decrease in these 
ratings directly impacts the supervisor through lower compensation in a timely manner. In addition, 
performance ratings typically play a role in promotion decisions and opportunistic behavior thus 
further indirectly jeopardizes the supervisor’s long-term career opportunities.  
Given the inherent difficulty to detect opportunism, the CC needs to resort to identifying 
signals that make it more likely that opportunism is the core root of the observed evaluation 
behavior. To draw conclusions about the likelihood that opportunistic behavior has occurred, the 
CC will combine signals of opportunistic behavior with further information and situations that the 
CC members experienced with the respective supervisor or her subordinates throughout the last 
year.7 Subsequently incorporating the identified signals of opportunistic behavior in the 
                                                          
6 One might argue that one option the CC has to mitigate opportunistic bias is to simply take away the incentive for 
opportunism by committing to not incorporate (average) subordinate performance in the evaluation of supervisors. 
While the CC can ex-ante commit to not take into account subordinate performance in evaluating the supervisor, this 
commitment is ex-post not efficient. The reason why the commitment is ex-post not efficient is that, if supervisors 
believe the commitment, they have no incentive to opportunistically bias the ratings proposed by them, which would 
make these ratings highly useful in evaluating the supervisor. Because it is efficient to use the ratings ex-post, the 
commitment is not credible. 
7 Given the incentive to inflate ratings and the inherent difficulty of detecting bias, some but not all supervisors will 
inflate ratings as the probability of detection is not one. This leads to a setting where many ratings are accurate, some 
are biased and will be corrected during the calibration sessions, but some still remain biased as not all biases are 
uncovered by the CC.  
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supervisor’s own annual performance rating is an effective mechanism to discipline undesirable 
behavior as it corresponds to the supervisor’s myopic attempt to minimize supervision efforts, and 
maximize personal short-term benefits at the expense of the effectiveness of the firm’s annual 
performance reviews. As a result, when concluding that the supervisor exhibits opportunistic 
evaluation behavior, we expect that the CC mitigates opportunistic bias by directly disciplining the 
supervisor with a decrease in her performance rating, which in turn creates implicit incentives to 
refrain from such behavior. Hypothesis 1a summarizes this expectation. 
H1a: Signals of opportunistic rating behavior have a negative impact on supervisors’ 
performance ratings. 
We further consider the effect of opportunistic behavior on the supervisor’s promotion 
probability. The promotion rule for sorting purposes makes promotion more likely when employees 
have developed the necessary skills for the next job (Grabner and Moers 2013).8 If opportunistic 
behavior is considered as a signal of an employee skill or type that the firm does not value, signals 
of opportunistic behavior will decrease a supervisor’s probability of promotion, and thus also dis-
incentivize such behavior. 
Regarding this disciplining effect, however, promotions might not be sufficiently effective. 
That is, promotion opportunities are typically not able to provide persistent effort incentives as the 
available opportunities vary between years (e.g., Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988), and therefore 
are less suited to dis-incentivize undesired behaviors in a timely and consistent manner. Given that 
opportunistic behavior needs to be disciplined as soon as it is detected to prevent the next 
performance period to be impacted by any ill-motivated effort, performance ratings seem more 
suitable to discipline opportunistic behavior than promotion opportunities.9 We thus expect that 
                                                          
8 The term promotion rule captures the implicit expectation upon which promotion decisions are based. 
9 To be complete, signals of opportunistic behavior do affect the likelihood of promotions indirectly. Given that signals 
of opportunistic behavior are expected to affect performance ratings (H1a) and performance ratings typically impact 
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promotion opportunities are less important for disciplining opportunistic behavior than 
performance ratings. We summarize this expectation in the following hypothesis. 
H1b: Signals of opportunistic rating behavior are less associated with supervisors’ 
probability of promotion than with supervisors’ performance ratings. 
Incentivizing investments in the development of supervisory skills (H2a and H2b). The inability to 
provide accurate feedback and ratings, which is typically reflected in compressed performance 
ratings (e.g., Künneke 2017), can be mitigated by investing in supervisory skills. These investments 
are unobservable and costly, and thus need to be incentivized (Mohrman and Lawler 1983; Murphy 
1992). Previous theoretical and empirical research shows that promotion opportunities are an 
effective mechanism to induce human capital acquisition, especially when the associated skills are 
more important for the next job (Grabner and Moers 2019; Prendergast 1993). The promotion rule 
for sorting purposes makes promotion more likely when the expected productivity of the acquired 
skills is higher in the next job (Grabner and Moers 2013). This promotion rule thus provides 
incentives to invest in skills that are (even more) relevant in the next position. Promotions are 
therefore an adequate tool for providing incentives to supervisors to invest in their supervisory 
skills (DeVaro and Gürtler 2015; Grabner and Moers 2019; Prendergast 1993). Supervisory skills 
not only include the willingness to differentiate among subordinate performance levels, but also 
the necessary capability to inform and support the development of subordinates when performing 
unsatisfactorily, and dealing with potential confrontations due to negative feedback. 
What makes promotions especially adequate for incentivizing such supervisory skills is that 
these skills are even more crucial when the supervisor advances in the corporate hierarchy, since 
this typically requires the supervision of higher-level subordinates who hold more far-reaching 
                                                          
the likelihood of promotions, signals of opportunistic behavior affect the promotion decisions through their effect on 
performance ratings. We return to this indirect effect when discussing the empirical results. 
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responsibilities. Therefore, especially at higher levels, the firm wants to ensure to promote 
supervisors with the necessary skills to adequately evaluate and develop their subordinates, hence 
minimizing the costs associated with performance evaluation bias (Mumford, Campion, and 
Morgeson 2007). Thus, as soon as the firm observes signals of outstanding supervisory skills, it is 
in the firm’s own interest to promote these supervisors to utilize the expected increase in the 
productivity of their supervisory skills. Hence, to ensure that supervisors have the appropriate skills 
that mitigate performance evaluation bias, we argue that, in making promotion decisions, the CC 
will directly take into account the supervisor’s ability to sufficiently differentiate among 
subordinate performance levels.10 This promotion rule provides supervisors with the implicit 
incentives to acquire the necessary skills (cf. Grabner and Moers 2019), and therefore we 
hypothesize:11 
H2a: Signals of supervisors’ skills to discriminate among subordinate performance levels 
increase their probability of promotion. 
While the literature shows that promotion-related mechanisms are effective mechanisms for 
inducing skill acquisition (Grabner and Moers 2019; Kahn and Huberman 1988; Prendergast 1993), 
we additionally examine the impact of signals of supervisory skills on performance ratings. A 
supervisor is usually held accountable for the performance of her subordinates, and subordinate 
                                                          
10 It is highly unlikely that all subordinates assigned to one supervisor will initially perform (equally) well and a high-
skilled supervisor will reveal that in her proposed ratings (rating discrimination). While a high-skilled supervisor 
improves the development of her subordinates, the full performance improvement is, however, not instantaneous but 
develops gradually over time. In the case supervisors would only keep the same subordinates, then one can expect that 
for high-skilled supervisors, over time the performance improvements will cause less dispersed ratings. However, due 
to the typical high inflow and outflow of employees and hence subordinates in professional service firms, the 
composition of the subordinate team per supervisor is highly volatile. Thus, it can be expected that high-skilled 
supervisors have continuously more dispersed ratings compared to low-skilled supervisors. 
11 For completeness, there is heterogeneity in responses to the skill development incentives triggered by promotion 
opportunities. While for some supervisors the increased likelihood of promotion is economically relevant, for others 
this incentive will not be sufficient to invest in their supervisory skills, especially given the costs they have to incur. 
The latter group of people, however, can be expected to be naturally “sorted out” in an up-or-out setting, and eventually 
leave the firm. 
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performance is not only affected by the effort the supervisor spends on the subordinates, but also 
the interaction of this effort with her existing supervisory skills. As such, supervisory skills already 
indirectly affect the supervisor’s own performance rating to the extent that such skills have been 
effectively used in supporting the development of her subordinates. Whether, over and above this 
indirect effect, skill development can be directly incentivized with an increase in the supervisor’s 
annual performance rating depends on the annual rating’s suitability for that purpose. In general, 
efficient incentives imply that certain behaviors can only be incentivized to the extent that these 
behaviors are productive. This specifically implies here that performance ratings can only 
efficiently incentivize skill development to the extent that supervisory skills are productive in the 
current job, i.e., to the extent that an investment in supervisory skills is beneficial to the supervisor’s 
current performance. While supervisory skills are important at the current level, these skills are 
more important at the next level because of the supervisor’s impact on potentially more, but also 
higher-level subordinates. That is, the marginal productivity of supervisory skills is lower at the 
current job level compared to the next job level. Given that behaviors can only be efficiently 
incentivized to the extent that these behaviors are productive, the incentives for developing 
supervisory skills via performance ratings is limited. While this does not necessarily imply that 
performance ratings are not useful for incentivizing the development of supervisory skills, it does 
imply that they are less useful than promotions since the latter mechanism focuses on the marginal 
productivity at the next position. We summarize this expectation in the following hypothesis: 
H2b: Signals of supervisors’ skills to discriminate among subordinate performance levels 
are less associated with supervisors’ performance ratings than with supervisors’ 
probability of promotion. 
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III. RESEARCH SETTING, SAMPLE, AND MEASURES 
Description of our research site 
Our research site is a member firm of an international professional service provider specialized in 
the fields of assurance, tax, strategy consulting, and corporate finance. The member firms are 
organized as separate legal entities in a network operating in over 150 countries worldwide, and 
we received our data from one of their largest member firms. The subsequent description of our 
research site is based on a set of interviews with important stakeholders in the firm, as well as 
internal documentation provided by the company. 
Supervision process. Each newly hired employee is assigned to a supervisor who is responsible 
to help the subordinates accomplish their performance and development goals.12 The supervisor is 
an experienced professional and typically at least two ranks higher in the hierarchy. Typically, in 
the beginning of the supervisor-subordinate relationship, the supervisor seeks information about 
the subordinate’s general profile such as existing knowledge and skills, as well as work-related 
interests. Based on the employee’s profile, the rank-specific general development plan for the next 
year is complemented by personalized goals that are developed together with the supervisor. 
Throughout the year, the supervisor arranges in coordination with the central resource planning 
office the regular staffing of the subordinate, i.e., the assignment to projects fitting the 
subordinate’s profile. This assignment is largely driven by capacity constraints, which implies that 
subordinates are typically assigned to projects where there is a demand for people. For each project, 
the employee receives formal feedback about the personal and professional project performance. 
In particular, the project leader rates each member of the project team on a number of pre-
                                                          
12 The matching of the supervisor and subordinate is executed by the HRM department, and based on availability, 
industry interest and to some extent educational background, but independent of any other criteria. That is, the 
matching of supervisor and subordinate is to a large extent random, and hence is unlikely to be correlated with potential 
determinants of supervisor performance.  
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established dimensions, resulting in a project rating.13 The project ratings serve as a first indicator 
helping the supervisor to determine the employee’s performance level.  
Annual performance evaluation process. At the end of the year, a formal performance review 
takes place, requiring several steps: prior to having an individual performance evaluation meeting 
with the subordinate, the supervisor gathers information on the subordinate’s performance, 
including project ratings and informal feedback from project leaders. During the meeting with the 
subordinate, the subordinate’s performance is assessed based on the achievement of the assigned 
and self-established goals, as well as the personal and professional development during the year. 
The supervisor subsumes all information with her personal impression about the subordinate’s 
capabilities into an initial performance rating. While it is highly recommended that the supervisor 
formally prepares this initial rating and communicates it to the CC prior to the meeting with the 
committee, it is not mandatory. As soon as all official annual performance reviews between the 
supervisors and subordinates are completed, all supervisors and (HR) partners gather to finalize 
the performance evaluation process in CC meetings, typically organized per office. The CC starts 
with the assessment of non-management employees. Typically, the supervisors present each 
subordinate to substantiate their initial rating. Based on the subjective evaluation of the supervisor, 
the CC discusses the performance of the subordinate, also taking into account other available 
performance data such as information on overtime and chargeable hours, as well project ratings, 
some of which are typically provided by other members of the committee. Furthermore, the 
experience of other CC members who worked on one or more projects with the employee in 
question are shared, and any sort of performance inconsistencies are clarified.  
                                                          
13 Note that the supervisor might be the project leader, but that is not necessarily the case given the process of 
assignment and because employees typically work on multiple projects with different project leaders. Our interview 
respondents indicated that in roughly half of the projects, the supervisor is not the project leader. Unfortunately, we 
cannot obtain information on which projects the supervisor also served as project leader. 
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After deliberation, the CC agrees on a final rating for each employee that reflects the 
employee’s performance relative to his peers.14,15 The final rating has direct consequences for 
salary increases and bonus allocation. Subsequent to the determination of the final ratings, the 
promotion candidates at each rank are compared and selected based on their current performance 
(final rating), but also with regard to competencies that are relevant in the next position. Once the 
non-management employees have been evaluated, their supervisors are evaluated next, and thus 
leave the meeting. This procedure ensures that the subordinates’ final rating is always determined 
prior to the final rating of the respective supervisor. It further allows the remaining evaluators to 
take the supervisors’ rating behavior into account when assessing the supervisors’ own final rating 
and promotion. Special attention is paid to supervisory skills when making promotion decisions.  
Sample, measures, and empirical models 
As we analyze decisions on the final rating and promotions of supervisors, our samples are 
restricted to employees having supervisor responsibilities. The final sample consists of 1,796 
supervisor-year observations, covering 952 unique supervisors in the period from 2010 to 2012.16 
Our main dependent variables represent the supervisors’ own final performance evaluation 
outcomes as determined by the CC. RATING reflects the final rating the supervisor receives from 
the CC and ranges from 1 to 5. In addition, we define a promotion as the advancement to the next 
hierarchical level, as defined by the internal job rating system. The indicator PROM equals 1 in the 
year the promotion decision takes place, 0 otherwise.  
                                                          
14 The rating scale for all performance-related information including project, initial, and final rating ranges from 1 to 
5.  
15 The firm’s documented rating guideline states the use of a forced rating curve when evaluating employees. However, 
several interview partners confirm that, in practice, this guideline is not enforced, but rather used as an advisory 
distribution. Interview partners confirm the widely held belief that a forced curve can lead to unfairness as employees 
might not receive the rating they deserve. 
16 As is typical for professional service firms, our research site is organized in organizational sub-units based on global 
geographic regions. We obtained data from one of the largest regional organizational sub-units. Given that the 
performance evaluation process is standardized throughout the whole organization and even comparable to 
competitors, our results are representative of the entire company/industry. 
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To test H1a and H1b, we aim to capture two different aspects of rating behavior that signal to 
the CC that it is more likely that opportunism is the core root of the observed evaluation behavior. 
The first measure is an indicator that equals 1 when the CC’s average adjustment of the initially 
proposed ratings of one supervisor (i.e., the average of all adjustments including upward, 
downward, and no adjustments made by the CC) is more negative than the average adjustments 
compared to all other supervisors per year, 0 otherwise (CC_DOWNGRADE).17 As alternative, we 
use a refined categorization in which we classify each supervisor based on the CC’s reaction to the 
supervisor’s reported initial ratings. For each supervisor, the CC has four options, which we capture 
with a respective indicator variable: (1) no adjustments to any of the initial ratings proposed by the 
supervisor (used as base category), (2) at the same time upgrade some initial ratings and downgrade 
others (RATING_ADJ), (3) only downgrade one or more initial ratings (RATING_DOWNGRADE), 
and (4) only upgrade one or more initial rating (RATING_UPGRADE).  
For the second measure, we define a variable intended to capture the strategic provision of 
information to the CC by the supervisor. By gathering and aggregating relevant performance-
information, the supervisor forms her evaluation about subordinate performance, resulting in the 
creation of the initial rating for her subordinates. However, when a supervisor prefers to first reflect 
more thoroughly with the CC members because, for example, the supervisor is in doubt about 
certain information, the initial rating is not necessarily formally determined before the meeting. 
While this flexibility allows supervisors to first align with the CC members whenever it is needed, 
supervisors can also strategically exploit this opportunity and single out favorable information 
about well-performing subordinates, i.e., provide initial ratings only for high performers, and 
                                                          
17 It is important to note that the average adjustment the CC makes, i.e., the difference between the final ratings and 
the initial ratings, is negative. This implies that the CC downgrades more than it upgrades, and thereby already corrects 
lenient ratings provided by the supervisors. CC_DOWNGRADE thus measures whether the CC downgrades a 
supervisor even further than the average adjustment. 
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disguise the underperformers. Such tactics of strategic information provision have been particularly 
found to be present in situations where the accountability of the supervisor is high, which is the 
case in our setting (Fandt and Ferris 1990). Therefore, our second measure captures supervisors‘ 
systematic, incomplete reporting behavior in favor of top performing subordinates, which 
potentially aims at opportunistically enhancing the committee’s impression of the supervisor. 
PRESENT_BEST is an indicator variable that equals 1 if, prior to the CC meeting, the supervisor 
decides to formally create the initial ratings only for those subordinates who are among the best 
according to existing performance data, 0 otherwise. We consider a subordinate among the best 
performing subordinates based on performance information that is mostly provided by sources 
other than the supervisor, i.e., project ratings; if the subordinate belongs to the top quartile in terms 
of average project ratings within one service line, then the subordinate is labeled as among the best 
performing subordinates.  
To test H2a and H2b, we aim to capture supervisory skills, i.e., the ability to handle the 
potential costs as result of the provision of honest performance feedback and consequently the 
discrimination among subordinate performance levels. SUBORD_DISCR reflects the 
discrimination among subordinate performance levels and, following Künneke (2017), is measured 
as the standard deviation of the initial ratings a supervisor provides to the subordinates in one year. 
In line with Künneke (2017), we argue that it is possible to derive valuable information about 
supervisory skills when (not) observing compression. When a supervisor decides to give accurate, 
and hence unbiased ratings, she signals that she is able to manage the potential costs, and hence is 
considered as having high supervisory skills. Given the general tendency towards compressed 
performance ratings, such supervisory skills are reflected in less compressed ratings. Next to the 
empirical validation of this measure for supervisory skills (Künneke 2017), the assumption that the 
variance in ratings in part reflects supervisory skills is consistent with the observation that firms 
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typically interpret compression as a signal of poor supervisory skills (e.g., Bingham and Beer 2012; 
Hall and Madigan 2000).  
To examine the relative importance of the various signals of supervisors’ rating behavior for 
performance ratings and promotions, we estimate the following two models using ordinary least 
squares and probit regressions, respectively: 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶_𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐵𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑗𝑡 
 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐽_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝐹𝐹_𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇_𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑗𝑡 
 + 𝛽8𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡 
 + 𝛽12𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑗 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶_𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐵𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑗𝑡 
 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐽_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝐹𝐹_𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝑗𝑡 
 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇_𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑗𝑡 
 + 𝛽12𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑗 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
where j relates to the supervisor and t to the year. Next to our main independent variables, we 
capture a set of supervisor-specific characteristics that supposedly influence the performance 
evaluation outcomes as control variables. The premise underlying H1a is that the average 
performance of the subordinates is positively associated with the supervisor’s performance, which 
provides the supervisor with incentives to inflate (some of) her subordinates’ initial ratings. To test 
this premise, we include the average performance of the subordinates per supervisor 
(SUBORD_RATING). Further, we measure the supervisor’s current performance in terms of 
average project ratings (PROJ_RATING), net engagement revenues (DIRECT_MARGIN), 
overtime measured as hours worked above the specified contract hours (OVERTIME), as well as 
past performance (RATINGt-1), all of which we expect to be positively related to the supervisor’s 
performance ratings, and potentially promotions. We additionally include the current final rating 
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(RATINGt) in the promotion model to account for the potential relevance of current performance 
in promotion decisions. We measure the supervisor’s effective utilization (EFF_UTIL), that is, the 
time directly spent on ongoing engagements, as chargeable hours divided by available hours.18 We 
measure the supervisor’s span of control (SPAN_CONT) by the number of subordinates to account 
for the possibility that the CC takes a supervisor’s varying contribution in terms of supervision 
time and effort into account when determining the performance outcomes of the supervisor. We 
further measure the supervisor’s tenure in the current job (rank) in years (JOBTENURE). Job tenure 
can be positively related to performance evaluation outcomes due to increases in effective ability 
over time (Gibbons and Waldman 1999) or negatively due to talented employees not remaining 
long in the same rank as a result of the up-or-out system (Lazear 2004). We therefore have no 
directional prediction. Finally, GENDER is an indicator variable that equals 1 (0) if the supervisor 
is a male (female). We consider GENDER to be a relevant predictor of rating and promotion 
decision outcomes, but as prior research provides mixed results (Rosen and Jerdee 1974; Tsui and 
Gutek 1984), we make no directional statement. Further, we control for rank-fixed effects to control 
for differences in performance levels and promotion probabilities across the hierarchy. Finally, we 
control for year-fixed effects. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample to test our predictions. We observe a promotion 
rate of 22 percent, which is in line with the company’s structured career development plan. The 
supervisor’s final ratings cover the entire rating range from 1 to 5, with a median of 4. In 36 percent 
of the supervisor-years, the supervisor receives at least one project rating per year, with an average 
of 1.6 project ratings per year. The project evaluations received have a rating of 4.18 on average. 
The effective utilization is around 78%, which can be explained by the fact that as of manager rank 
                                                          
18 EFF_UTIL, DIRECT_MARGIN, and OVERTIME are winsorized at the 1% level. 
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the time spent on other tasks than chargeable hours increases. Supervisors typically support 3 
subordinates per year. 
--------- Insert Table 1 ---------- 
Table 1 further shows that downgrades of initial performance ratings provided by the 
supervisors regarding their subordinates is way more common than upgrades, which is consistent 
with a tendency towards upward-bias. In 23% of the supervisor-years, at least one of the initial 
ratings provided by the supervisor is downgraded without any ratings being upgraded. In contrast, 
in only 4% of the supervisor-years, at least one of the initial ratings is upgraded without any ratings 
being downgraded. To dig deeper into the link between the supervisors’ evaluation behavior and 
the calibration process, we provide detailed statistics on the initial performance ratings provided 
by the supervisors. The average initial performance rating at the subordinate-year level is 3.67. We 
divide the sample into subordinate-year observations where the initial rating provided by the 
supervisor was either downgraded, upgraded, or remained unchanged during the calibration 
process. Consistent with expectations, the average initial rating provided by the supervisors is 
significantly higher for those subordinates whose initial ratings were downgraded in the calibration 
process (4.05) as compared to an upgrade (3.45) or no change (3.60). We further conduct a similar 
analysis at the supervisor-year level. Supervisors for whom at least one initially provided 
performance rating of their subordinates was downgraded, while none was upgraded, show a higher 
average initial performance rating (3.86) as compared to the remaining supervisors (3.59). This 
analysis provides first evidence consistent with the CC lowering lenient performance ratings.  
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlations between the independent variables. While none of the 
correlations cause multicollinearity concerns, a few correlations are noteworthy. First, 
SUBORD_DISCR is not correlated with sub-dimensions of performance in the current job such as 
DIRECT_MARGIN and PROJ_RATING, suggesting that our measure of supervisory skills indeed 
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captures a different underlying dimension. Further, SUBORD_DISCR is significantly negatively 
associated with effective utilization (EFF_UTIL). This negative association is in line with 
Westermann et al. (2015), who find that one of the factors that inhibit the provision of proper 
supervisory feedback is other competing demands on a supervisor’s time. The negative correlation 
reflects these competing demands and suggests that the more supervisors are staffed on ongoing 
projects during the year, the less time they have to invest in their supervisory skills.  
--------- Insert Table 2 ---------- 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Consequences of opportunistic rating behavior (H1a and H1b) 
Table 3 reports the results for H1a. As reported in Column I of Table 3, when the CC identifies the 
need to correct overly inflated ratings, i.e., substantially downgrades initial ratings that are 
suggested by the supervisor (CC_DOWNGRADE), the supervisor’s own final rating is lowered as 
well (p<0.01, two-tailed). In addition, if a supervisor presents a more detailed assessment of only 
her best subordinates during the CC meeting (PRESENT_BEST), we observe an additional 
lowering of the supervisor’s performance rating (p<0.05, two-tailed). This finding implies that 
opportunistic behavior, both in terms of directly inflating subordinates’ ratings and impression 
management, is disciplined by the CC and comes at a direct cost for the supervisor. In sum, our 
findings indicate that the CC disciplines supervisors via lower performance ratings when they are 
assumed to provide opportunistically biased information, providing support for H1a. To provide 
insights into the economic magnitude, we express the economic significance in terms of the 
probability of receiving a particular performance rating and how this is affected by 
CC_DOWNGRADE and PRESENT_BEST. We find that the probability of receiving a rating of 3 
or less increases by 13% when observing significant downgrades and increases by 37% when the 
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supervisor presents a more detailed assessment of only her best subordinates. This suggests that 
the effects of CC_DOWNGRADE and PRESENT_BEST are economically significant.19 
Column II of Table 3 reports the results when using our alternative measure for 
CC_DOWNGRADE. We find that when the CC identifies the need to correct inflated ratings, i.e., 
downgrades one or more initial ratings that are suggested by the supervisor while upgrading none 
(RATING_DOWNGRADE), the supervisor’s final rating is lowered (p<0.05, two-tailed). We do 
not find this effect for RATING_UPGRADE or RATING_ADJ. That is, if one or more ratings 
provided by the supervisor are (also) adjusted upwards, there is no additional effect on the 
supervisor’s performance rating. Importantly, the insignificant coefficient of RATING_UPGRADE 
confirms our expectation that the CC does not attribute low ratings provided by the supervisor to 
any kind of strategic behavior as there is no economic incentive to decrease subordinate ratings on 
purpose. Most importantly, these results confirm that indeed opportunistic rating behavior is 
disciplined. Overall, our results provide strong support for H1a.  
Table 4, Column I reports the results regarding H1b, which predicts that signals of 
opportunistic rating behavior are less associated with supervisors’ probability of promotion than 
with supervisors’ performance ratings. We find that signals of opportunistic behavior, captured by 
CC_DOWNGRADE and PRESENT_BEST, are not associated with the probability of promotion, 
which together with the findings in Table 3 is consistent with H1b. To formally test H1b, we 
compare the marginal effects of CC_DOWNGRADE and PRESENT_BEST between the probability 
of receiving a promotion and the probability of receiving a performance rating greater than 3. When 
                                                          
19 The results also show that SUBORD_RATING has a highly significant and positive effect on the supervisor’s final 
rating (p<0.01, two-tailed), after controlling for different dimensions of the supervisor’s current performance 
(PROJ_RATING, DIRECT_MARGIN, OVERTIME) and overall past performance (RATINGt-1), all of which also 
positively affect the supervisor’s final rating. This finding is consistent with the assumption that subordinate 
performance reflects to some extent the actual supervision provided, for which the firm rewards the supervisor, thereby 
providing the supervisor with incentives to inflate average subordinate performance. 
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comparing the marginal effects between the first model using RATING as dependent variable and 
the second model using PROMOTION as dependent variable, we find that the marginal effect of 
CC_DOWNGRADE is, at the margin, significantly different between the two models (p=0.119, 
two-tailed) and the marginal effect of PRESENT_BEST is significantly different between the two 
models (p<0.05, two-tailed). A test of the joint significance of these differences is also statistically 
significant (p<0.05, two-tailed). These results provide support for H1b. Note that the probability 
of promotion is positively associated with RATING, which confirms the expectation that 
opportunistic rating behavior has an indirect effect on promotion decisions. A formal test of this 
indirect effect (Sobel 1982) shows that the indirect effect is statistically significant for both 
CC_DOWNGRADE (p<0.01, two-tailed) and PRESENT_BEST (p<0.05, two-tailed).20 
--------- Insert Table 3 ---------- 
Consequences of supervisory skills (H2a and H2b) 
The results for H2a are reported in Table 4, Column I. We find that supervisors who sufficiently 
discriminate among performance levels of their subordinates (SUBORD_DISCR), and thus are also 
less lenient, have a significantly higher probability of promotion (p<0.05, two-tailed). Note that 
such discrimination cannot be simply mimicked by a supervisor who does not have the skills to 
provide negative feedback because it requires using the entire rating scale, and especially a low 
rating implies costs and further consequences that such a supervisor tries to avoid. In terms of 
economic significance, the results imply that moving from the first quartile of SUBORD_DISCR 
to the third quartile of SUBORD_DISCR, i.e., comparing a low-skilled supervisor to a high-skilled 
supervisor, increases the probability of being promoted by approximately 28%.  
                                                          
20 The significance levels are based on confidence intervals of bootstrap OLS estimates of the indirect effects, using 
random sampling with replacement and 5,000 bootstrap samples (Preacher and Hayes 2004). 
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In addition, we repeat this analysis within a sample of supervisors who are responsible for at 
least 3 subordinates, thus eliminating supervisors for which the lack of discrimination is a less clear 
signal of a lack of supervisory skills. The results reported in Column II of Table 4 confirm our 
expectation that rating discrimination is an important determinant of promotion decisions. The fact 
that the results are even stronger in this subsample is consistent with the assumption that the ability 
to identify the performance levels of subordinates should become more salient, the higher the 
number of subordinates a supervisor takes care of. To corroborate this assumption, we include an 
interaction term between SUBORD_DISCR and SPAN_CONTR. The results for this additional 
analysis reported in Column III of Table 4 show that the interaction is positive and significant 
(p<0.01, two-tailed). This suggests that the CC realizes that, with an increasing number of 
subordinates, the likelihood of having the same performance level decreases, and thus considers a 
differentiation as inevitable, which needs to be reflected in the provided initial ratings.21 These 
findings support our conclusion that the firm indeed takes the ability to discriminate amongst 
subordinate performance levels into account when making promotion decisions. In sum, we 
provide strong support for H2a. 
Finally, our results for H2b, as reported in Table 3, show that supervisory skills in the form of 
subordinate discrimination (SUBORD_DISCR) are not significantly associated with the 
supervisor’s final rating in any of the two models. H2b predicts that supervisory skills are less 
associated with supervisors’ performance ratings than with supervisors’ probability of promotion. 
Our finding that supervisory skills in the form of subordinate discrimination are strongly associated 
with promotions while it is not associated with performance ratings is in line with H2b. To formally 
test H2b, we compare the marginal effect of SUBORD_DISCR between the probability of receiving 
                                                          
21 This also confirms that, given the lower likelihood of all subordinates having equal performance, the supervisor’s 
discrimination level is interpreted as an even stronger signal for supervisory skills, and hence receives more weight in 
the promotion decision. 
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a promotion and the probability of receiving a performance rating greater than 3. When comparing 
the marginal effect between the first model using RATING as dependent variable and the second 
model using PROMOTION as dependent variable, we find that the marginal effect of 
SUBORD_DISCR is significantly different between the two models (p<0.10, two-tailed). These 
results provide support for H2b and confirm a lesser role of performance ratings in incentivizing 
the development of supervisory skills as compared to promotions.  
--------- Insert Table 4 ---------- 
Robustness tests 
Alternative test of hypotheses. Given that the decisions regarding the rating and the promotion are 
taken during the same meeting, we also use an alternative estimation approach. In particular, we 
use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) equations to reflect the simultaneity inherent in these 
decisions. To have different sets of explanatory variables for these equations, we solely focus on 
H1a and H2a and jointly estimate the following models:22  
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶_𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐵𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑗𝑡 
 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐽_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐹𝐹_𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇_𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑗𝑡 
 + 𝛽8𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑗 
 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐽_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡 
 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐹𝐹_𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇_𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑗𝑡−1 
 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑗 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
where j relates to the supervisor and t to the year. Table 5 reports the results of the SUR using 
CC_DOWNGRADE, while Table 6 reports the results using the alternative measures for 
                                                          
22 Note that if the same set of explanatory variables are used, SUR is identical to equation-by-equation OLS. Such an 
analysis would therefore not provide any information over and above those reported in Table 3 and 4.  
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CC_DOWNGRADE. In both tables, Column I (II) relates to the supervisor’s performance rating 
(promotion). These analyses confirm that our results for H1a and H2a are robust when controlling 
for the correlation between the error terms of the two equations.23  
--------- Insert Table 5 and 6 ---------- 
Alternative measures for subordinate discrimination. We apply alternative measures for the extent 
to which the supervisor discriminates among subordinates and define the following additional 
measures to capture supervisory skills: HIGH_DISCR (indicator variable that equals 1 if a 
supervisor’s discrimination is larger than the median discrimination of all supervisors within a year, 
0 otherwise), ADJ_DISCR (supervisor’s discrimination adjusted by the median discrimination of 
all supervisors within a year), RANGE_SV (the difference between a supervisor’s highest and 
lowest initial rating provided to subordinates), HIGH_RANGE (indicator variable that equals 1 if 
a supervisor’s initial rating range is larger than the median rating range of all supervisors within a 
year, 0 otherwise), and BELOW3 (indicator variable that equals 1 if a supervisor provides an initial 
rating that is below 3, and 0 otherwise). In addition, we use a factor analysis to estimate the 
underlying latent construct, using these four variables plus SUBORD_DISCR. Principal component 
analysis reveals one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1, explaining approximately 91% of the 
total variance. The analyses show that all alternative measures for supervisory skills have a positive 
and significant association with the promotion likelihood of a supervisor.24 None of these 
alternative measures have an effect on the final rating. 
 
 
                                                          
23 For completeness, if we switch the key explanatory variables across models, none of the variables related to 
opportunism or supervisory skills are significant, in line with our results in Table 3 and 4 related to H1b and H2b. 
24 HIGH_DISCR: β=0.332, p<0.01; ADJ_DISCR: β=0.435, p<0.05; RANGE_SV: β=0.277, p<0.01; HIGH_RANGE: 
β=0.671, p<0.01; BELOW3: β=0.613, p<0.05; and FACTOR: β=0.144, p<0.01. 
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V. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
In line with our theory, the analysis of the firm’s archival performance evaluation and personnel 
data confirms that supervisors’ documented evaluation behavior is systematically related to their 
performance evaluation outcomes. We provide evidence that the CC considers skills such as the 
development of subordinates, which includes the provision of reliable ratings and corresponding 
feedback, as necessary to climb the corporate hierarchy. Further, supervisors are rewarded for the 
effort they exert in increasing their subordinates’ performance. In contrast, supervisors who 
presumably deliver biased information and reveal evaluation behavior that is undesirable for the 
firm, are likely to face direct negative compensation consequences as well as indirect negative 
career consequences. To validate the extent to which these findings are recognized by the 
management of the company, we conducted interviews with partners involved in the performance 
evaluation process at our research site, as well as another member firm in the professional 
network.25 
First, our interview partners stress that the CC emphasizes the accuracy of the initial rating as 
they rely to a great extent on the supervisor to form a final performance rating. Given the 
information asymmetry between the CC and lower-ranked employees, the information signals 
provided by the supervisor have to be as accurate and unbiased as possible to make informed 
decisions regarding the final rating as well as promotions. One partner notes that one of the main 
reasons for calibration sessions to exist is the fact that supervisors tend to overrate their 
subordinates, which has to be corrected. This not only confirms that biased ratings are a significant 
concern but also that the CC is used as a mechanism to identify and mitigate the biases that 
supervisors introduce. 
                                                          
25 In particular, we conducted two interviews with the same partner at our research site, as well as interviews with two 
partners at another member firm in the professional network. 
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Second, the interviewees indicated that managers and senior managers are evaluated based on 
how much time they spend on supervision and whether they focus on developing the subordinates’ 
skills or just gather a group around them to perform their work. In all this, the quality of feedback 
by the supervisor is crucial for good supervision and both interviewees clearly confirmed the 
importance of rating discrimination as a relevant signal of supervisory skills. As one partner put it 
when referring to the lack of discrimination as a signal of poor supervision: “it is striking when a 
supervisor only has good subordinates…this is where subjectivity starts to play a negative role.” 
The interviewees also stated that the promotion criteria for (senior) managers focus on how well 
they perform on projects as well as how good they are as a supervisor, which confirms that rating 
discrimination as a signal of supervisory skills is considered in promotion decisions. 
In addition, while the partners confirmed that signals of opportunistic behavior, such as 
impression management, are recognized by the CC, they suggest different strategies of how this is 
typically dealt with. In line with our predictions, the partner from our research site confirms that 
such behavior is immediately disciplined through the performance rating process. This disciplining 
seems to be effective, given that we observe that supervisors whose initial ratings were 
substantially downgraded, are approximately 50% less likely to be downgraded again in the 
following year. The partner mentions that while it is understandable that supervisors do not want 
to be associated with underperforming subordinates for their own sake, this behavior is 
unacceptable in terms of rating accuracy and fairness concerns. One of the partners in the member 
firm suggests a more implicit way of dealing with this. In particular, supervisors exhibiting this 
kind of behavior are confronted with it in a private conversation, either during a break or 
immediately after the CC meeting. This highlights the importance of addressing this behavior in a 
timely manner. Repeated offenders will also “feel” it directly in their ratings. The interviews not 
only clearly confirm that the CC is aware of the occurrence of opportunistic rating behavior, they 
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further confirm that – if detected – these signals of opportunistic behavior can impact the 
performance rating of the supervisor, resulting in the pattern we document. Overall, our interviews 
provide support for our theory that supervisors’ evaluation behavior is monitored by the CC and 
taken into account in their performance ratings and promotion decisions.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Research on subjective performance evaluations has identified the most important drawback of its 
use: the fact that these evaluations can be distorted by the evaluator, and therefore not always reflect 
the employee’s “true” performance. Bias in performance evaluations is problematic because it 
comes at high direct and indirect cost for the firm, especially when these evaluations are used in 
compensation and personnel decisions (Moers 2005). Firms therefore face the problem that the 
information content of subordinates’ performance evaluations might be misleading because 
supervisors lack the skills to provide adequate ratings or because they intentionally inflate them. 
In this study, we show that the firm is aware of this problem, and tries to mitigate it by holding 
supervisors accountable for their evaluation behavior. In particular, CCs make use of the annual 
performance evaluation process, and its effect on subsequent compensation to dis-incentivize 
opportunistic rating behavior. In particular, the CC disciplines such behavior by downgrading the 
performance ratings of supervisors identified as providers of opportunistically biased information.  
Further, consistent with the literature on human capital acquisition (e.g., Grabner and Moers 
2019; Prendergast 1993) we find that promotion opportunities are used to incentivize investments 
in supervisory skills by making promotions more likely for supervisors that have acquired these 
skills. The relevance of this type of skill, in addition to being a driver of subordinate development 
(Künneke 2017), is highlighted in another study by Ahn, Hwang, and Kim (2010). They provide 
evidence that the perceived degree of discriminability of performance measures motivates 
employees to exert more effort and improve their performance, which is one of the main goals of 
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a firm’s evaluation system. Although prior literature suggests that lenient ratings can have 
motivational effects on employee performance (Bol 2011), our findings indicate the importance of 
discriminability and the CC thus incentivizes supervisors to reduce rating errors. This supports the 
firm in identifying true performers and assigning appropriate rewards, and increases the perceived 
fairness of the evaluation system, which potentially outweighs the benefits of lenient performance 
feedback. Thus, our results reinforce the importance of evaluation skills as a promotion criterion 
to secure the achievement of these goals, while also showing that the effort related to the provision 
of accurate evaluations and the actions to improve employee performance are rewarded.  
Our findings underscore the different roles of compensation-based and promotion-based 
incentives in achieving goal alignment, i.e., incentives to provide goal-directed effort versus 
incentives to invest in the development of productivity-enhancing skills. A natural question that 
arises is to what extent these incentives are indeed effective in changing supervisors’ evaluation 
behavior over time. Given our short sample period, we can unfortunately not explicitly examine 
any learning issues, but we see this as a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Finally, although we examine a specific set-up of a CC that is typical in professional service 
firms, our theory is not limited to this particular design or even having a CC. As long as higher-
level managers are able to observe supervisors’ evaluation behavior, either directly or indirectly, 
they can incorporate the observed evaluation behavior in their assessments of the supervisors. Thus, 
similar incentives can be created irrespective of whether, for example, the same CC also evaluates 
the supervisors’ performance or has the right to make promotion decisions. Nevertheless, another 
fruitful avenue for future research is to examine whether different types of CCs in terms of 
composition and allocated decision rights address the incentive problem of biased performance 
evaluations in different ways.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Description 
BELOW3 indicator variable that equals 1 if a supervisor provides an initial rating that is 
below three, 0 otherwise. 
CC_DOWNGRADE indicator variable that equals 1 if the calibration committee downgrades the 
initial ratings of the supervisor more than the average adjustment across all 
supervisors per year, 0 otherwise. 
DIRECT_MARGIN the supervisor’s net engagement revenues for one period. 
EFF_UTIL the supervisor’s effective utilization measured as chargeable hours divided by 
available hours. 
GENDER indicator variable that equals 1 (0) if the supervisor is a male (female). 
HIGH_DISCR indicator variable that equals 1 if a supervisor’s discrimination is larger than the 
median discrimination of all supervisors per year, 0 otherwise. 
HIGH_RANGE indicator variable that equals 1 if a supervisor’s rating range is larger than the 
median rating range of all supervisors per year, 0 otherwise. 
JOBTENURE the supervisor’s tenure in the current job (rank) in years. 
OVERTIME the supervisor’s hours spent in addition to available hours according to contract. 
PRESENT_BEST indicator variable that equals 1 if the supervisor provides initial ratings only for 
the best-performing subordinates, 0 otherwise (best is defined as top 25% 
employees in terms of project ratings within one serviceline per year).  
PROJ_RATING the supervisor’s average project rating received from projects completed during 
the last year. 
PROM indicator variable that equals 1 if the supervisor advances to the next rank, 0 
otherwise. 
RANGE_SV the difference between a supervisor’s highest and lowest initial rating provided 
to the subordinates. 
RATING the supervisor’s own final rating provided by the calibration committee. 
RATING_ADJ indicator variable that equals 1 if in the same year, the calibration committee 
downgraded at least one initial rating and upgraded at least one initial rating 
suggested by the supervisor, 0 otherwise. 
RATING_DOWNGRADE indicator variable that equals 1 if at least one final subordinate rating is lower 
than the initial rating, i.e., the calibration committee lowered the initial rating 
suggested by the supervisor but did not upgrade any initial rating, 0 otherwise. 
RATING_UPGRADE indicator variable that equals 1 if at least one final subordinate rating is higher 
than the initial rating, i.e., the calibration committee increased the initial rating 
suggested by the supervisor but did not downgrade any initial rating, 0 
otherwise. 
SPAN_CONT the number of subordinates per supervisor. 
SUBORD_DISCR reflects the supervisor’s discrimination among subordinate performance levels 
measured as the standard deviation of the initial ratings. 
SUBORD_RATING the average final rating across all subordinates that are assigned to the same 
supervisor per year. 
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TABLE 1 
 Summary Statistics  
        n   Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
PROM 1,796 0.22 0.42 0 0 0 
RATING 1,796 3.76 0.71 3 4 4 
CC_DOWNGRADE 1,122 0.36 0.48 0 0 1 
RATING_DOWNGRADE 1,122 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RATING_UPGRADE 1,122 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RATING_ADJ 1,122 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRESENT_BEST 471 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 
SUBORD_DISCR 808 0.43 0.35 0 0.55 0.71 
SUBORD_RATING 1,745 3.41 0.45 3 3.33 3.67 
PROJ_RATING 645 4.18 0.48 3.88 4.25 4.50 
EFF_UTIL 1,796 77.83 24.36 67.0 80.94 92.42 
DIRECT_MARGIN 1,796 383,120 293,665 149,632 328,807 564,172 
OVERTIME 1,796 183.75 144.42 68.05 153.90 273.70 
RATINGt-1 1,739 3.73 0.68 3 4 4 
SPAN_CONT 1,796 3.07 2.19 2 3 4 
JOBTENURE 1,796 5.33 4.84 3 4 6 
GENDER 1,796 0.68 0.47 0 1 1 
Data are for the time period 2010-2012 and the sample size relates to supervisor-years. See Appendix for variable 
descriptions. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix 
Correlations Between Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 PROM 1.00                 
2 RAT’ING 0.28*** 1.00                
3 CC_DOWNGRADE -0.07 -0.07 1.00               
4 RATING_DOWNGRADE 0.08 0.08 -0.24** 1.00              
5 RATING_UPGRADE -0.08 -0.09 0.96*** -0.24** 1.00             
6 RATING_ADJ 0.14 0.09 -0.14 -0.05 -0.20** 1.00            
7 SUBORD_DISCR 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 1.00           
8 PRESENT_BEST 0.07 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 1.00          
9 SUBORD_RATING 0.04 0.25** -0.25*** 0.21** -0.26*** -0.03 0.10 0.03 1.00         
10 PROJ_RATING 0.24** 0.74*** 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.08 0.14 1.00        
11 EFF_UTIL 0.16* 0.21** 0.05 -0.11 0.03 0.10 -0.16* -0.03 0.05 0.20** 1.00       
12 DIRECT_MARGIN 0.18* 0.38*** 0.15 -0.07 0.11 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.21** 0.34*** 0.40*** 1.00      
13 OVERTIME 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.15 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.13 -0.02 0.13 1.00     
14 RATINGt-1 0.25** 0.73*** -0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.23** 0.61*** 0.15* 0.34*** 0.18* 1.00    
15 SPAN_CONT -0.09 0.16* 0.12 0.05 0.18* -0.04 0.01 0.16* -0.08 0.15 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 0.09 1.00   
16 JOBTENURE -0.13 -0.22** -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.15 -0.18* -0.05 -0.26*** -0.18* -0.20** 0.09 1.00  
17 GENDER 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.05 -0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.16* -0.05 0.07 0.05 0.15* 0.02 -0.04 1.00 
Data are for the time period 2010-2012 and the sample relates to supervisor-years. See Appendix for variable descriptions. 
*, **, *** is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 3 
Effect of Supervisor’s Evaluation Behavior on the Supervisor’s own Final Rating  
(OLS estimations) 
 
 
Pred. sign (I)  (II)   
    
CC_DOWNGRADE − -0.081***    
 (0.029)   
RATING_DOWNGRADE −   -0.071** 
    (0.030) 
RATING_UPGRADE ?   0.0135 
    (0.063) 
RATING_ADJ ?   0.044 
    (0.094) 
PRESENT_BEST − -0.227**  -0.225**  
 (0.089)  (0.089) 
SUBORD_DISCR +/0 -0.012  -0.012  
 (0.051)  (0.051) 
SUBORD_RATING + 0.076***  0.077***  
 (0.027)  (0.027) 
PROJ_RATING + 0.398***  0.397***  
 (0.046)  (0.030) 
EFF_UTIL  ? -0.0001  -0.0001  
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
DIRECT_MARGIN  + 0.0002***†  0.0002***
† 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
OVERTIME + 0.0005***  0.0005*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
RATINGt-1 + 0.582***  0.582***  
 (0.024)  (0.024) 
SPAN_CONT ? 0.014  0.015 
  (0.010)  (0.010) 
JOBTENURE ? -0.013***  -0.013*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
GENDER ? 0.005  0.004 
  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Constant  0.031  0.033  
 (0.123)  (0.123)   
  
 
Rank-fixed effects  yes  yes 
Year-fixed effects  yes  yes   
  
 
Observations  1,796  1,796 
Adjusted R2  0.537  0.537 
Data used in the estimation are for the time period 2010-2012 and the sample size relates to supervisor-years. Standard 
errors are in brackets and adjusted for clustering at the supervisor level. See Appendix for variable descriptions. 
*, **, *** is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively (two-tailed).  
† multiplied by 1000. 
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TABLE 4 
Effect of Supervisor’s Evaluation Behavior on the Supervisor’s Probability of Promotion  
(Probit estimations) 
  Pred. sign (I) (II) (III)  
     
CC_DOWNGRADE  −/0 0.007 0.072 -0.009  
  (0.111) (0.137) (0.112) 
PRESENT_BEST  −/0 0.272 0.171 0.316  
  (0.373) (0.487) (0.370) 
SUBORD_DISCR  + 0.426** 0.741*** 0.307*  
  (0.175) (0.234) (0.167) 
SUBORD_DISCR*SPAN_CONT +   0.144*** 
     (0.054) 
RATING  + 0.675*** 0.562*** 0.691*** 
   (0.106) (0.127) (0.107) 
SUBORD_RATING  ? 0.080 0.273 0.074  
  (0.097) (0.166) (0.096) 
PROJ_RATING  ? -0.149 -0.232 -0.150  
  (0.139) (0.194) (0.139) 
EFF_UTIL   ? -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.007***  
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
DIRECT_MARGIN   ? 0.0005***† 0.0004* 0.0005***†  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OVERTIME  ? 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RATINGt-1  ? 0.326*** 0.395*** 0.331***  
  (0.081) (0.115) (0.081) 
SPAN_CONT  ? -0.025  -0.068* 
   (0.028)  (0.036) 
JOBTENURE  ? -0.012 -0.0126 -0.011 
   (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) 
GENDER  ? 0.368*** 0.270** 0.379*** 
   (0.089) (0.116) (0.090) 
Constant   -0.838** 0.090 0.231  
  (0.383) (0.320) (0.097)     
  
Rank-fixed effects   yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects   yes yes yes   
 
 
  
Observations   1,796 954 1,796 
Pseudo R2   0.357 0.351 0.360 
Data used in the estimation are for the time period 2010-2012 and the sample size relates to supervisor-years. Column 
I (III) reflects results for the whole sample for which data are available. Column II relates to a subsample of supervisors 
who have at least three subordinates. Standard errors are in brackets and adjusted for clustering at the supervisor level. 
See Appendix for variable descriptions. 
*, **, *** is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively (two-tailed).  
† multiplied by 1000.  
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TABLE 5 
Effect of Supervisor’s Evaluation Behavior on the Supervisor’s own Final Ratings and Promotions  
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression estimation) 
  
 Pred. sign  RATING PROM   
   
 
CC_DOWNGRADE 
 
−  -0.077** 
 
  
  (0.031) 
 
PRESENT_BEST 
 
−  -0.219** 
 
  
  (0.098) 
 
SUBORD_DISCR 
 
+   0.086**   
   (0.035) 
SUBORD_RATING 
 
+, ?  0.075*** 0.017   
  (0.028) (0.019) 
PROJ_RATING 
 
+, ?  0.397*** 0.033   
  (0.043) (0.031) 
EFF_UTIL  
 
?  -0.0001 -0.001***   
  (0.001) (0.000) 
DIRECT_MARGIN  
 
+, ?  0.0002***† 0.0001***†   
  (0.000) (0.000) 
OVERTIME  +, ?  0.0005*** 0.0002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
RATINGt-1 
 
+, ?  0.582*** 0.135***   
  (0.019) (0.014) 
SPAN_CONT  ?  0.013** -0.003 
    (0.006) (0.004) 
JOBTENURE  ?  -0.013*** -0.004** 
    (0.003) (0.002) 
GENDER  ?  0.005 0.086*** 
    (0.026) (0.018) 
Constant 
 
  0.028 0.332***   
  (0.103) (0.073)       
Rank-fixed effects 
 
 
 
yes yes 
Year-fixed effects 
 
 
 
yes yes       
Observations 
 
 
 
1,796 1,796 
Adjusted R2       0.537 0.307 
Data used in the estimation are for the time period 2010-2012 and the sample size relates to supervisor-years. Standard 
errors are in brackets. See Appendix for variable descriptions. 
*, **, *** is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively (two-tailed).  
† multiplied by 1000. 
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TABLE 6 
Effect of Supervisor’s Evaluation Behavior on the Supervisor’s own Final Ratings and Promotions  
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression estimation) 
  
Pred. sign  RATING PROM   
   
 
RATING_DOWNGRADE  −  -0.072**  
    (0.032)  
RATING_UPGRADE  ?  0.007  
    (0.059)  
RATING_ADJ 
 
?  0.0112 
 
  
  (0.118) 
 
PRESENT_BEST 
 
−  -0.217** 
 
  
  (0.099) 
 
SUBORD_DISCR 
 
+   0.086**   
   (0.035) 
SUBORD_RATING 
 
+, ?  0.076*** 0.017   
  (0.028) (0.019) 
PROJ_RATING 
 
+, ?  0.397*** 0.033   
  (0.043) (0.031) 
EFF_UTIL  
 
?  -0.0001 -0.001***   
  (0.001) (0.000) 
DIRECT_MARGIN  
 
+, ?  0.0002***† 0.0001***†   
  (0.000) (0.000) 
OVERTIME  +, ?  0.0005*** 0.0002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
RATINGt-1 
 
+, ?  0.581*** 0.135***   
  (0.019) (0.014) 
SPAN_CONT  ?  0.014** -0.003 
    (0.006) (0.004) 
JOBTENURE  ?  -0.013*** -0.004** 
    (0.003) (0.002) 
GENDER  ?  0.004 0.086*** 
    (0.026) (0.018) 
Constant 
 
  0.028 0.332***   
  (0.103) (0.073)       
Rank-fixed effects 
 
 
 
yes yes 
Year-fixed effects 
 
 
 
yes yes       
Observations 
 
 
 
1,796 1,796 
Adjusted R2       0.537 0.307 
Data used in the estimation are for the time period 2010-2012 and the sample size relates to supervisor-years. Standard 
errors are in brackets. See Appendix for variable descriptions. 
*, **, *** is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively (two-tailed).  
† multiplied by 1000. 
 
